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By A. W. Brian Simpson
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a s s d m of b d i d d d rights

&zancltudd his paper by

n May 1954 a replacement had to be found for Sir Amold
McNair, who did not wish to continue on the International

I

Court of Justice.The British Foreign Office got in touch with the

Lord Chancellor, the awful Lord Simonds, who took the view

th.tno English judge would take the job since the pension was
hadequate.

The Minister of State, Selwyn Lloyd, wrotet o him on the

I.

[

1
1

-

subject, pointing out that there were a number of possible
candidates among academics -their peesiun arrangements
were no problem. The letter explained that "ofthese, by far the
most eminent is Professor Hersch Lauterpacht, Q.C., ofTrinity
College Cambridge. He is not British by origin,,but be has been
matuskzed for mire than 20 years, and continuously resident ,
in the country upwards of 30. He is very much liked by all who
h a w him, and despite his continental origins, his outlook on
legal matters reflects mainly the Anglo-Saxon approach. Owing
to hi. origins, he would not perhaps be what we should re@ as
entirely sound from our point of view on matters of h u m rights;
that is to say, his bias would be to take perhaps too wide a view
on di5.topic. However, irrespective of the character of the British
judge this is a subject which we would always wish to keep away
from the court, in any event. Therefore, I doubt whether the point
matters."
How did it come about that Hersch Lauterpacht, then the
Whewell Professor of International Law in Cambridge, achieved
the distinction of being considered not quite "sound"by the
Foreign Office on human rights?
The story begins at a 1942 meeting of the Grotius Society,
the only British intellectual institution then existing that brought
together academics and practitioners. Lauterpacht addressed the
society on December 7, 1942, on "The Law of Nations, the Law
of Nature, and the Rights of Man." He argued that although the
conception of the law of nature long predated explicit reference
to the existence of natural and inalienable rights, yet in substance
theories of natural law had, even in the ancient world, incorporated ideas that were, in the Enlightenment, to find expression in

How did it come
about that Hersch
Lauterpacht,
then the Whewell

arguing that lif the enthrone~nentofthe*Ertsofman
is to became a reality9then
they must become pnrt of the
positive law of nations suitably
guannteed and enforced?
So farm1 a m aware, this
was the first paper or lecture
ever devoted to this subject and
delivered in England, either
before a learned sod9 or
in a university setting. Rare
exceptins apart, such as the
Catholic Richard 0'Sullivan,
common [oommon law system]
lawyers of this period had not
the slightest interest in theories
of natural law, or in the a m ciation, for use in domestic
law, of catalogues of individual nat
intematiod protection.
One wonders what induced Lauterpacht to choose so u n p ~ m ising a topic?The due is the reference to "the enthronementof
the rights d man."Thisrefers to a message that had been givm
by Winston;C h m M to the World Jewish Congress in October
1942, when he had referred to "the enhne3nent of human
rights" as a war aim. It is, 1 think, pretty obvious that growkg
knowledge of what was happening to the European Jews underlay
his choice of subject. TheJewish Chrodde reported the m d e r of
two million Jews on December 11,1942, and on December 17
Anthony Ed- made a statement in the House of CO-ons,
the
House rising to stand in silence in response to this.The nation
state had signally Eailed to provide protection; the international
communiq must fill the breach.
Lauterpacht's legal writings adapt a severely professional
style, and his paper, typically, makes no reference to the horrific
events that were, at the time, overtaking the European Jews, and
indeed his own family back in Poland. Only a niece was to survive
the war; his parents, his brother and sister, and a l l but one of
their children -I do not h o w how many there were -were
murdered, and in all probability already had been murdered.
When he learned of their fate I do not know, but by April 1946
he must have received some information, since he was involved

International Law in
Cambridge, achieved
the distinction of

not quite "sound" by
the Foreign Office on
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in obtaining a visa for his niece to come to England. It is charac-

question of what was to be done with such a bill of rights once

teristic of Lauterpacht that his first essay on the subject of human

its substance was settled, and faced up to the grave problems

rights is of a theoretical rather than a practical nature.

that were bound to confront an attempt to establish institutional

The GI-otius Society was not to return to the position of the

mechanisms for implementing such a bill. Lauterpacht's book was

individual in international law until 1944, whenvladmir R.

innovative in that it faced up to problems of implementation and

Idelson read a paper on "The Law of Nations and the Individual."

proposed solutions.

Idelson, a Russian Jew by extraction, was a highly successful
King's Counsel in practice at 13 Old Square, Lincoln's Inn. It was

The approach Lauterpacht adopted was radically different
from that which was to prevail w i t h the Foreign Office, under

Lauterpacht who responded to Idelson's paper, and introduced the

the dominating influence of the Legal Adviser, Eric Beckett.

subject of the international protection of human rights. Idelson

Beckett had a bee in h s bonnet about considering issues in what

had drected his paper in part to discussion of the hoary old

he thought was the correct order. He took the line that the first

dogma that individuals were merely the objects of international

issue to be addressed, if any progress was to be made, was the

law, not the subjects. Lautherpacht thought perhaps too much

definition of the rights and their limitations. Only when this had
been achieved should issues of implementation and enforcement

attention was devoted to this do,ma:

". . . if international lxw \yere now to provide for the so-called
fundamental rights of man by means of an international conven-

be considered.
Lauterpacht began at the other end; the critical issue \firas to

tion enforceable at the instance of states, I suppose we would say

settle what institutional arrangements could and ought to be

that inhviduals \vould be the objects of international law, but I am

established if the international protection of human rights was

not sure that would be a very satisfactory achievement. It could

ever to become a reality. Definition was of secondary importance.
In his book, Lauterpacht argued that the avowed purpose both

not be the final achievement. Thls must consist in the recognition
of the natural rights of man -h s right to equality, to freedom

of the first and second world wars had been, to quote Churchill,

of opinion and expression, to personal freedom conceived as the

"the enthronement of human rights." He explained the adoption

right to government by consent -as an enforceable part of the

of this \var aim by the r e c o p t i o n that protection of fundamental
rights and democracy was a prerequisite to international peace,

law- of nations."

In response to Idelson's paper, a committee was set up under

a popular if slightly suspect way of linking human rights protec-

Lord Porter to consider international law and the rights of

tion to the primary function of the United Nations organization.

the individual. It reported on J ~ m e3, 1945, recommending an

He argued for protection in international law, since no system of
law, whether international or domestic, was "true to its essential

attempt to proceed along the lines of the International Labor
Organization by small stages.
Lauterpacht was not, however, involved in t h s initiative.
Instead, he had been writing his book on the subject and drafting

function" unless it protected "the ultimate unit of all law -the
individual human being." He argued that adopting an international
bill of rights that did not impose international obligations would

an international bill of rights. By the autumn of 1943 Lauterpacht

convey the false impression of progress, and be essentially a step

had largely completed his book, An International Bill ofthe Rights
ofMan, published by Columbia University Press in 1945 with

backwards, and would even "come dangerously near a corruption

financial support from the American Jewish Committee. By the

of language."
He then, and this was typical in his work on the subject, spelled

time it appeared, the notion that the protection of individual

out, very pessimistically, the grave difficulties that were llkely

rights was a war aim had become widely accepted. The book

to impede the attempt, if it were to be pursued, to de~relopan

included the text of Lauterpacht's bill. During the war, a number

obligatory international bill of human rights.

of bills of rights had been produced and published, notably by

Lauterpacht was well aware of the traditional skepticism of

I-I. G. Wells and Ronald iMacKay in 1940, and by a committee of

English law-yers as to the value of abstract declarations of the

the American Law Institute in February 1944, so Lauterpacht's

rights of man. It would be difficult to overemphasize this skepti-

bill was not the only one offered.

cism, and worth remembering that half a century later the United

But nobody had ever published an up-to-date study of the

Kingdom still did not possess a domestic bill of rights. So for

subject that not only embodied clear and specific l~roposalsas to

the book he wrote an entirely new chapter, which is entitled

the contents of a bill of rights, but also seriously addressed the

"Natural Rights in British Constitutional Law and LegalTheory."
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Human rights visionary
Hersch LauterpacM

,]:~autcrpedtargued that the reason, historically, why Onat Britain
t was out af line with most other states was the result of the fkct
'there hod evolved a tradition of respect for English liberties
which, as it were, made declarations of the rights of man seem
unnecessary, ~ I S W
:
j.+:;~:
fi
1
Thm was, he argued, no compelling reason why such a dech- ration of rights might not be adopted in Great Britain without it
I forming part of a comprehensive mitten constitution. He then
addressed the problem of protecting such a declaration against
parliamentary sovereign9 and the chapter concludes with a
Delphic passage that does not really explain how this is to be
brought about.
The text of an International Bill of the Fbghts of Man, together
with a comznentary upon it, appears in Part I1 of the book. At
this time the United Nations as a political organization had not
yet been established, but Lauterpacht assumed it would be. He
envisaged that his bill would be adopted by the United Nations as
"part of the fundamental constitution of international society and
a f their own states." H
is bill was oEered as a legal document, not a
political manifesto. So it was intended both to confer definite and
enforceable rights and duties in international la\y between states,
and to confer rights in international law on individuals.
I '
It necessarily followed that it had to be enforceable by some
form of international procedure, over and above whatever
machinery existed in the domestic legal systems of states.
Furthermore, its adoption would require a substantial sacrifice
of state sovereignty, even though its provisions might conform to
'
practices followed in civilized states already.
Laiiterpacht approached the subject as a$-holar, indeed as a
legal scientist, qualified to work it all out for himself, and impose
his views on the international community by the pure force of
their own rationality. Far and away the most important part of his
book is its treatment of enforcement of an international bill of
rights. Lauterpacht's view on this was based on three principles:
The first was that normal enforcement must be a matter for
domestic law, and so incorporation of his bill into domestic law
was to be mandatory.
The second was-thatthere must be established a permanent
international authority, which would be concerned not simply
with abuses of rights, but with ongoing supervision and monitoring. This body, he argued, must be neither a political body
nor a judicial body; he rejected the idea of internationaljudicial
review as both impracticable and politically impossible.
His third principle was that this authority must possess an
ultimate and effective power to enforce the bill. Lauterpacht
'

7
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In his book,
Lauterpacht arguc
Mat the avowed
purpose both of the
first and second
world wars had
been, to quote
Churchill, "the
enthronement of
human rights!'
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1
aoncemd--w&e~&dadhd ~ a e n i . ~ C i .
nothing to prevent it h m ~ettingup an &maehimq $P
I
C o d s s i o a *ms B m o e ~ ~ that p ~ e s e ?
*In particular, the H m a n Rights
He &a stmngk a i t i a d ths d d a h tbt h e mambms riif the
its char@r
C o h s s i o d had no puwer to
Human Rights Commbsion shodd%kp n n ~ m e n t drepmsmta,
i e i ~ m r ~ d l W B. S do mything at all about the
tiwe:I?epro0zacedbia idea that the m o n i w g body & d d be
numerous petitions that were
nek.her judicial nor palHiCa in cham'
il
already arriving from hrdnidAnd he ofiPosed rhe C-sdon
p l n fPsr to drift a d&hwaB B ~ b~dy
uala and poups who imagined
tion of pri~ciplesbecause he bdimmd the adtaprimd a d a d j a that the United Nations was
tion without some mhns of enl~Or-iegt 4 ~ & ~ e P - t %ere
that wam ge@g.to'be
in the business of actively
lip service to a cause which wsa~p$aimedas one ofthe ajrrr

ll9#$

to buman
the
8

I
I
I

He tlllso attacked the mamd
inwhich the Human Right$

I

t

prSma~ilyinwbed
was the Humalg
Rights Owmimion.
fke powem~ofthe

protecting human rights.
This vim was adopted by the
Economicand S o d Council
on August 5,1947: ". . .neither
the Commission on Human
Rights nor the Commission
on Women l y l any power to
take any action in regard to
complaints concerning hmnan
rights or the status of womtm."
So such petitions were
merely stored away to collect
dust in the archives.
by
Lauterpadt accepted none
of dais. 13s argument, first
presented in a c o m e at The
Hague in -the summer of 1947,
was that the pr0vision.s in the
charter p l e d a positive obligation on the United Nations to
promote respect for h u m rights and hdannental freedoms, and
&obrerv-.The
absence-of a text spelling out what these
rights and 6reedoms were did not deprive the text of the charter
of practid sigdiunce. Hornan rights and f u n h e n t a l freedoms
were rather like elephants; you did not need a definition of an
elephant to reoognize one when you met it. This was p a r k M y tbe cme when gra~sa b w a took place. The provisions in the
charter referring to human rights meant that violatiuns of hmm
rights were no longer off limits as being matters essentially of
doarestic juridiction.
He argued that: There is no+
in terrm of its reference or
in the charter to prevent the Commirshm, when wnfr~atedwith
a complaint, to prcrmt it from dLcllssingit, h m invatigathg
it, and from making a recommendationor T o r t cm thc subject
-either in gentd terms or with specific reference to the atate

organs of the United

humandghts-were,
however, limfled

.
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purposes in which the W t e d Nations were engaged, \
Excluded fiom direct hyohrcment in the Unlted Nltiom negotiations, Lauterpacht turned to h e ~ t e m A Law
d Associatiicld
when it held its &st postwar conference in Cambridge im 1946.
Among .the attendees was Rnfael Lemkin, i n m i o r of the concept
of genocide, and revulsion at the recent h i s t T o f Emope was
much in the air. Profemor Paul de had& r e d a paper on
*he ~ossible
madificatiom ofthe ~d
Natioos Quter, and
the conference adopted msolutiom k t the Charter should be
a m d a d to include "the hdamental and ~ v e r l h rights
g
of
personaliq, namely uhe righf.to poasees a natisnality, the right to
justice, and the right of 4 e s s i n g fully every opdion."It dm
passed a resolution d
- executive detention in peacetime.
The next cod*
took place in h g u e izl September
1947, and Lauterpacht used the o p p m p i t y to set out his vie%
in a paper delivered on September 2. <Hereceived support and
the association adopted a number sf resolutions calling -the
executive committee to1set up o committee ar c o d t t e e s
to ~tudy,in relation to h ~ a rights,
n
the lee1 effects of the
Charter and of Article 2 (7),the contents and edo~cemmtof an
, the interpretation and enforceinternational bill of r i g h ~and
ment of the b a g . right. pmvidonr of the peace aeaties. Qe
Secretary General was to be told kt the Association b u g t
the submission of a bill frights to the GeneralAssembly should
be postponed m&il1850, md proceeded by objective stdy. The
As6ociatbn alao wished to.associate itself with a declaratiraa by the
Economic and S o d C-d
of June 2 1,1946, that Zhe purpose
of the Uriited Natiom with regard to the pfamtizm,andh e r vauce of human rights, as defbedin the Charter . can tmly be
Miilhd if pnmidonr an mads for & imphentatha dhuman
r i g h ~lad
, for an international bill of rights?
In effect, Lnterpacbthpd hijacked the Laernation$d Law
AssoWon.Two c e w a wre erstablished, m e ~mdbedto
gtudy of be peace treaties. LPmterpacht b
e the ruppmem for

..

I

Human ngnrs vlslonary
Hersch LauterpacM

"Nothing contained
in the present
charter shall
h-ath4.3
authorize the United
ofyi&w.%]n*W.,~29 - %pfeagbber 4,1948. h t before &a, batxqimh
h p ~ y r ~ ~ r h c C ~ m H - p pk wp , hi k - k ; * e
Nations to intervene
l {w
,wa~~tthelepsr+thptdL
i b-e laand r n 1 ~ % ~ 8 , 1 ~ einr ; rhc
in matters which
are
~
c
d
Naba e - u ~ . n3h h tbe mart tr&2
;eFaWmmtd his
dews m the infeqmtatia and s e c e of& WE-:
essentially within
EZio ~epmtairgued f
h the & h i o m was wrong ha i~ 1947
the domestic juriswhidall md &e h a m Rights
raalthat it pomrcsed no competence tn tJre &over
c o w d p a b m
pf$t.imm.k c o d tiah any adon A m t dhtmventbn.
diction of any state
&
e i ~ , o r & ~ Ciimdhsim 4:mpositioa is q :
T h e Conmhwion is
or shall require the
tiomua&rwhi&&edof
u d f k l y tu amtin the fid SW-C of m o d authority and
p
4 edlkctimeaar unl,~ss, in addition to- repreeantdva
d m & q r b e P i l l d ~ h & w q ~ Members to submit
proceed. E M the US-A. or
of ge*cmmmts, it include8 private i d v i d d ahwem irmpxthe U.K.,os even I suppose the
such matters to
@veaf heir a a t i d t y , haugh a selective pr&cess wldch in
U.S.S.R., adapted b views
i t d b m d d provide a guarantee of i m p & r w P
settlement under
the stmy my+ Ebawe beem
E z d m e m t L the crudal pfob1em far an intarnationalbill af
Werent, but none of them
rights.m e a mere d ~ c h t i o might
n
be
au expresthe present Charter;
did. Coamddly d o p t i a by
sion of deep b t o r i d expieace and of the m o d sense ofi
but this principle
a n u d e r ofthe lesser p
m
m d d : sueh d e c h ~ o 9without say d m e n mecha~
might have be- dcimt.
nis- ' ' ~ ~ u lfo~ter
c l the spirit of W a o e n t and, among
shall not prejudice
But this did not happen, and
mmy, of cpiQism. The argent need of m&d is not the
the application
& e E o e ~ o ncorntimed as
r e c o ~ ~ and
o n declaration sf fundamental h h a n righ~but
their effective prowction by internationalsociety."
before. HsIwasa vni'ce c y h g
of enforcement
in the ddenzess.
He attacked the Commissiio~n'sdecision to drajFt a convention to
measures under
In 1948 a new opportumity
WE&
states &at wished to cauld aceede. This would be useless
for Lauterpacht to became
d w s it embodied means of enforcement and was adopted by
Chapter VII!'
directly involved m human
many countries.
&I

,

P

At thispaint there existed a United Nations draft declaration
and a draft covenant. Lauterpacht had no use at all for either,
but he did not criticize the texts in detail, basically because he
thought tht way in whichthe operation had been conducted was
f u n h n t a w . misconceived
~
-his idea was that a body of expert
hte~natimdlawyers would undertake the task of studying snd
drafbg, the C o ~ s i o n ~ r o v i d guidance
hg
of s politid natun.
one ran odjwpedate, but I think it is &P that Lauterpacht
wantad to be one of the intmnatiionnl lawyers engaped in this
work. His presentation to the United Nations of his own Wt
was a way of showing his fitness for the tPBL,aid by workrig as
mp~UFlaW
b 0 q h and ~ i tthe
h ~l43pOTtof &E ~ P W M ~ ~ hOwA ~
Assaci9thn he could present hic v i m s as being supported by at
least moat of the world's expert internatip"al lawyers. The tiimbg
~ . l Unfortunate
ll
inthat his report had n ~ t ' ~heen
e t formally

rights negotiations began to
develop. In May af that year
The H a p Congress was
convened, an unofficial gathering organized by the European
Movement that was pressing for the establishnnemt of a feded
Europe. This called for the establishment sfa pvUanareetaq
assembly, and fm the production d a European charter of
human rights. Partidly inrespanse to the pmwre bcm federalists, the Council of Europe was established inMarch 3845).
The European M o m e n t held amther coderence in Brussels
in 194% Lauterpacht attended, along with three other l ~ e r s
from England, one being the h e t i c a n Arthur Goodhart, and
the others David Maxwell-Eyfe, whom Lanterpacht would have
known fmm Nwranberg days, and 1. Hwrout h d n p n .

The Hague Congress had established a juridical commission,

t o the horror of ministers, colonial civil servants, and Field

the Drapier Commission, and in March 1949 it put forward

Marshal and Governor Sir John Harding, the United Kingdoin

proposals for a Charter of Rights and a European C o u r t of Human
f i g h t s . Lauterpacht was certainly involved in the work of the

\.irassubjected t o serious meddling indeed, including an on-thespot investigation over the methods used to suppress the EOKA

Conlmission, b u t dtd n o t , so far as I have been able t o discover,

[Greek Cypriot group favoring union with Greece] insurrection in

play a particularly active role; he probably merely acted as a

Cyprus in 1955-5 9.

- -

consultant, like a number of other jurists. As with the practical

If we believe the judges in Strasbourg, and I am not suggesting

United Nations negotiations, and earlier with the Grotius

that we do not, human rights violations are taking place in all the

Society's Porter Committee, he remained essentially an outsider,

Western democracies, as well as in Central and Eastern Europe,

and perhaps this was by choice. Most of the \vork was done

not t o mention the former Soviet Union, o n a daily basis, and this

by Harcourt Barrington, \\rho was paid 100 guineas, ~ h l c he
h
received, i n conforlnity t o English legal tradition, after prolonged

is only partially the result of moving the goal posts by interpreting
the Convention as a living instrument. Absolutely nobody thought

delay.

that h s was the situation in the 15 signature states back in 1950,

O n July 9 , 1949, after establishment of tlze Council of Europe
o n March 1 7 , 1949, the Brussels proposals were considered at a

and Lauterpacht was certainly not an exception t o the general
mood of self-congratulatory optimism. H e never imagined that

meeting of the Grotius Society, and Lauterpacht read a paper on

the Strasbourg institutions would become intrusive. O n e nronders

"The Proposed European C o u r t of Human Rights."This meeting

what he would have made of Strasbourg of today, with Secretariat

was attended by Harcourt Barrington, who, referring t o the

and Court at risk of destruction in part by the living instrument

scheme of enforcement, paid tribute t o Lauterpacht:

they have developed, and by the huge extension of the coverage

"I would like t o take the opportunity of acknowrledging our
great debt t o h m , because we dtd quite shamelessly b o r r o ~ vmany

of the Convention, as well as by the use of the Convention by
individuals who, back in the 1950s and even the 1970s and 1980s,

ideas from his draft Covenant o n the Rights of Man prepared for

would have simply accepted their lot.

the International Law Association in 1948 ."
H e further explained that "there is a body of opinion I favor of
having the rights described very shortly with a view t o building

So far as the United Nations negotiations were concerned,
Lauterpacht was never t o play any direct role in them; he was

up by judicial decisions as we go along a kmd of common law o n

involved in the International Law Conlmission between 195 1 and
1954 on the law of treaties, and in 1954 he became a judge o n the

the subject, and there is another body of opinion which favors a

International Court of Justice. H e died in May 1960.

detailed definition of the rights. As far as the draft is concerned,
those who favor a short description have prevailed."
Lauterpacht's paper commented on the proposals and repeated
his view that "an international court, conceived as the primary
o r exclusive instrument for the enforcement of human rights, is

So, at the end of the day, what is one t o say about L a ~ t e ~ p a c h t ' s
role in all this? I feel that Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice got it more or
less right in a talk published in the BrltishYearbook ofInternationa1
Law in 1979:

"A few words, first, of a personal nature recalling Sir Hersch

with the Brussels scheme because the center of gravity lay with

Lauterpacht's work on human rights, in the course of which he
did so much t o turn that subject from something of a largely

the Commission: "The jurisdiction of the European Court would

ideological character -more an aspiration than a reality

neither practicable nor desirable." But he was prepared t o go along

- into

thus b e in effect of a residual character. It would be invoked only

a judicial concept having practical possibilities. It is certain,

after the means of settlement had failed."

however, that his preoccupation with it sprang from a different

It is clear that the institutional structure that eventually
emerged in the European Convention was partially derivative of

part of his personality from that which made him -by any
reckoning - one of the most eminent jurists of our time, and

Lauterpacht's draft Convention. And, whether the Foreign Office

without a peer in the international field. Some of his preoccupa-

liked it o r n o t , there vvas established both a meddling Commission

tion must have derived from his origins in Austrian Poland in the

and a C o u r t of Human Rights. But the capacity of the Commission
t o meddle, and of the C o u r t t o invade state sovereignty, were

years before World War I."
The basic claim that Lauterpacht's contribution was t o

much reduced by making acceptance of the right of individual

establish, by an analysis of options and problems, the practical

petition, and the jurisdiction of the Court, optional. Even so,

possibility, given appropriate institutions, of the international

72
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protection of inclividual human rights is surely right. As he several
times said, the core of thc problem of human rights was enforccmcnt. He \vould surcly havc been pleased that the Strasbourg
Court has so often insisted that rcmedics for the \riolations of
human rights must he practical ant1 cffectivc, not theoretical o r
illusory. And, as I hope I havc shown, hc, albeit always an outsider,
a significant part in laying the foundations of the European
svstem that has shown itself capable of achieving this ideal.
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